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essays barely speak to each other: these are powerful demonstrations of the resistance put up by the practical forces of book production and the relentless machinery of the academic enterprise, to some of the most sophisticated theorising of that enterprise, even—or especially—when that sophistication is so beautifully "contained" within the covers of a book.

Stephanie Trigg

The Life and Work of Fredson Bowers. G. Thomas Tanselle. Foreword by David L. Vander Meulen. Checklist and chronology by Martin C. Battestin. Charlottesville: Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia, 1993. viii + 210 pp. $25.00.

"TO US HE IS NO MORE A PERSON / Now but a whole climate of opinion," as Auden sang of Freud, might with equal justice summarize the influence of Fredson Bowers, in the tiny microclimate of bibliography and textual studies. Nevertheless, it is a verdict that Tanselle resists in his memorial, celebrating both the life and the work of his subject. The present volume, reprinting his essay and Martin Battestin's bibliography from *Studies in Bibliography* 46 (1993), adds a useful index that makes them both much more accessible for reference, and it inaugurates a welcome series of "Occasional Publications" by the Bibliographical Society of Virginia. The "Life," I feel, will probably be of less interest to most readers than the "Work"; but both are filled with Tanselle's affection for his subject and his passion for bibliography.

The Irish wolfhounds, the stamp cancellations, the music reviewing, the sound system (28 loudspeakers), and fast, expensive cars that formed Bowers's frenetic avocations, indeed, and the subject of secret, amused awe among his inner circle, must finally be reckoned among the great man's foibles. Tanselle valiantly draws analogies between the description of a breed, a postmark, and the pressing of a disk, and what was for Bowers, as it must be for anyone who reads this book, the One Real Good Thing, but they are unconvincing, and occasionally cheeky. Bowers's hobbies are hardly comparable, in passion and seriousness, for example, with the dedication of a connoisseur like Sir Geoffrey Keynes (86–87)—whatever our opinion of Sir Geoffrey's abilities as a bibliographer. Tanselle accords the lineage of the Bowerses, the Sutphens, and the Hales the same grave attention as that of his wolfhounds, whereas the ordinary business of living retreats into a mere framework for his scholarly career. Bowers's first marriage, to a Sutphen during his senior year at Brown, was conducted in "the utmost secrecy" (6)—indeed, the secrecy was so total that we never learn how this son of a Connecticut manufacturer met his wife, a New York socialite, whether her parents approved, nor why their children and the wolfhounds mysteriously disappear from the story after their divorce. His second marriage, to the novelist Nancy Hale, was childless: she had had a child by each of her previous husbands, and he had had four by his first, so that the decision was not unnatural; but when did Bowers ever find time for parenting? "I . . . have taken on more than I should," he wrote his eldest son

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in 1982, "but . . . I have a horror of not having enough to do" (121). Between 1960 and his death he had edited no fewer than sixty volumes, a record that Tanselle rightly calls "amazing." Perhaps it also explains why none of the biological children of a man who was *Doktorvater* to twenty-two boys and six girls ever showed a professional interest in bibliography or books; this biography ventures no opinion on the matter.

As we would expect, on the other hand, Tanselle provides an incomparably helpful, expert guide to Bowers's work, which ranged so widely that it is hard to be aware of all its ramifications. As the textual editor of Fielding's *Miscellanies*, for example, I felt obliged to depart from Greg's "Rationale," but for the sake of consistency with previous volumes in the Wesleyan Edition, and also in deference to Bowers's great authority, I wished to show that the result was consonant with his principles. Tanselle would have guided me to a useful precedent in the Harvard University Press edition of William James, which in my ignorance as a *dixhuitièmiste* I had overlooked. Equally important, though it can hardly have been pleasant work to research and write, is Tanselle's account of the response to Bowers's editions and polemics. He was a highly successful and tireless proselytizer for bibliography as he conceived it, eliciting frequent "conversions" of the sheep, as Tanselle shows, but also frank hostility and rancor from the goats. Though he did not actively seek for combat, and his manner was normally courteous, he had little patience for Laodiceans, and Tanselle too sometimes elevates the murmurs of the half-hearted into mortal provocations. The sin of poor Sir Geoffrey Keynes, for example, is an inability to master the intricacies of the collational formula. American punctilio and British broadmindedness would continue to generate tensions over the years.

A good measure of Bowers's success is the impression, current among academics, that "bibliography" is synonymous with what McKerrow more accurately qualified as "bibliography for literary students"—that is, the methodology needed to prepare a scholarly edition of a printed text. Bowers encouraged this illusion, especially in *The Bibliographical Way* (1959), which proposes scholarly editing as the *Tao* or *ultima ratio* of bibliography; his views have recently been elaborated by D. C. Greetham in *Textual Scholarship* (1992); and Tanselle takes their authority for granted. A very little reflection, however, should show how small a part of our cabbage patch editing really is: W. A. Jackson, Graham Pollard, Jacob Blanck, A. N. L. Munby, Edwin Wolf III, Rollo Silver, and John Oates, for example, contributed nothing to "bibliography for literary students," and yet if these are not bibliographers, where is bibliography to be found? Conversely, Bowers did no work in the area of publishing and trade history, in which even his hero Greg, indeed, was proficient. Bibliography as Bowers saw it impinged on editing in the determination of the history of the text (or the recension, as a classicist would call it); thereafter, what Bowers a little daringly labeled "bibliographical evidence" was roughly equivalent to spelling and punctuation. There were

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certainly some who felt he made too large a claim for our discipline, but in fact it was surprisingly small, judged by what he left out.[1]

Bowers's intensely focused vision, of course, was entirely his own choice, but a wider perspective is needed to understand the differences between him and his critics, and Tanselle has not provided it. Thus Bowers can lament the "distrust of analytical bibliography" in the work of Philip Gaskell and D. F. McKenzie (112–13), and Tanselle echoes him, charging that a recourse to bibliographical archives evinces an "abandonment" of the "physical evidence in books"; and that

> A suspicion of analytical bibliography, publicized in McKenzie's "Printers of the Mind," exists in other quarters as well—such as among those historians of the book who work in the tradition of the French school of *histoire du livre* and stress the role of books in society.

One might almost suppose that the number and arrangement of the leaves in a book had ceased to matter, but in point of fact, of course, Gaskell, as historian of the Foulis Press, and McKenzie, as historian of the Cambridge University Press, have rather more formidable achievements in analytical and descriptive bibliography than Bowers himself. His only comparable publication, after all, is a 54-page pamphlet on George Sandys, written with the help of Richard Beale Davis (1950), and the author bibliographies appended to his editions deal with a relatively limited and straightforward group of books; whereas McKenzie and Gaskell contend with a full range of subjects and authors, their paper, types, ornaments, and history of publication. Such "sociological" interests should not be confused with the theoretical concerns of a scholar like Jerome McGann, though for the moment they march to the same drummer, and McKenzie (unwisely in my view) has encouraged the confusion.[2]

McGann, no doubt, distrusts "physical evidence" and the discipline that controls it, but Gaskell and McKenzie rather question the assumptions that Bowers too often relied on in order to make sense of the evidence—or more accurately, to constitute the data as evidence in the first place. The social context within which they pose their inquiry indeed intensifies their interest in many physical features of the book that Bowers had little use for, such as layout or ornaments, "accidentals" that fall outside Greg's definition in his "Rationale." Ironically, too (in view of Tanselle's argument), the very physical evidence on which Bowers depended was selected by textual (i.e. purely mental) criteria, in apparent defiance of Greg's celebrated dictum about arbitrary black marks. Bowers too would contend that he cared only for "impersonal and non-conceptual inked prints," but as Thorpe pointed out, he

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[1] Cf. James Thorpe, *Principles of Textual Criticism* (San Marino, Cal.: Huntington Library, 1972), 100–101.

[2] D. F. McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* (London: British Library, 1986); and cf. the reservations expressed in my review, *Book Collector* 36 (Aut. 1987).

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no sooner embarked on textual criticism than he became "a heretic to his bibliographical faith" (103). Hence the apparatus takes no account of whether an s is long or short or ligatured or of a certain size; textually, it becomes the index of the phoneme \s\ or \z\.

If anyone has "abandoned" the "physical evidence in books," then, it is rather Bowers than McKenzie and Gaskell, and we need not look to the trendy shibboleth of *l'histoire du livre* for a reason. As practised by many eminent bibliographers both before and after Bowers shrank the discipline, bibliography is a broadly historical craft that takes its evidence where it finds it, in or out of books. Because the external documentation of printing is sparse and late, the bibliographer must often depend on the advice of Henry Bradshaw, which Paul Needham so fondly cites, to shake his evidence vigorously and view the results, but it is a *pis aller* and effective only in narrowly defined situations and (as Needham concedes) "properly prepared minds."[3] The *I Ching* too proposes to settle our problems by rattling and casting of yarrow sticks, but it is a technique best restricted to conundrums beyond the reach of ordinary intelligence.

Like the scientist, whose prestige he so often arrogated to his own work, Bowers set about his task by restricting the scope of his data. The subordination of bibliography to textual analysis backgrounded the features of texts that were normally absent from the author's holograph—not only type size, ornaments, paper, and layout, but also larger matters. In the Wesleyan University Press edition of Henry Fielding, for example, the subscription list to Fielding's *Miscellanies* (1743) and the advertisements for the Universal Register Office (which figures, anachronistically, in the narrative) in *Amelia* (1751) vanish without discussion or (perhaps) regret. The typographical hierarchy of dedications, conventionally printed two sizes larger than the text, is silently leveled; the tripartite *tomaison* of *Tom Jones* is recast in two volumes. Opinions indeed may differ about how these matters should be handled, and certainly no one questioned Bowers's judgment at the time, but in retrospect one may well ask whether such "accidentals" are not more vital to our reading of the texts than their spelling and punctuation. Fielding's *Love in Several Masques* opens with an engraved historiated initial showing some masquers; *Pilgrim's Progress* with a factotum containing a little wilderness; the illustrations to the early editions of Thackeray, Dickens, Edward Lear, and Stevie Smith have an authority nearly superior to that of the text, for many readers. And yet, because they are non-verbal, they may be relegated to the status of "non-textual elements" for Bowers and Tanselle.[4] The distinction is arbitrary: bibliography, at least, treats these elements as no different from the "impersonal and non-conceptual inked prints" that, for Bowers, make up the "text."

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[3] Review of Staffan Fogelmark, *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 87 (1993): 514.

[4] G. T. Tanselle, "Editing Without a Copy-Text," *Studies in Bibliography* 47 (1994): [1]–22, at p. 3.

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Central to Bowers's editing was the wish to "strip away the veil of print,"[5] laying bare the holograph even of authors like Whitman whose script was printed. A bibliographer with any sense of the integrity of his craft, however, will hesitate to applaud an exercise where print figures rather as an obstacle to the text than as an instrument of its expression. The removal of the "veil," indeed, entailed not only Herculean labors of analysis, but a nimble and imaginative use of conjecture, to make sense of the ever-mounting, Augean heap of "facts." In a revealing letter of 1985, Bowers candidly (and endearingly) remarks, "Quite honestly I feel not that I am especially bright except that [sic] so many other scholars are not very good either and probably do not work so hard as I used to" (149). He would have needed less imagination, and perhaps less labor, McKenzie and others might argue, had he pursued his inquiry more widely, and the results, though less "rigorous" (a recurrent term of praise for Tanselle) would have been better history. By isolating the role of the textual editor from that of the commentator—a persistent feature of his editions—Bowers seemed to underline the priestly "rigor" of his craft, as though the letters on the page might be herded into shape without regard for their meaning or historical context; yet for just that reason, the procedure risked an uncontrolled, and quite unrigorous liberty of conjecture. McKenzie might demonstrate that the production of a seventeenth-century printing-house was more chaotic than Bowers had assumed; Gaskell could point to other bases for a choice of copy-text than an analysis of the "accidentals"; Thorpe might prove that many authors preferred the spelling of the compositor to their own poor efforts.[6] In every case, however, Bowers would treat these criticisms as exceptions to a "rule" that rested on gists and piths at best. A rule is handy, of course, for the occasions when evidence is wanting, but too often it served as a presumption that had to be overthrown.

Tanselle tries to deflect these criticisms by arguing that the editor may choose to establish his text in a variety of ways, either socially, with McKenzie and Gaskell, or by an appeal to intention, with Bowers; an edition is "the product of judgment, which is necessarily subjective" (140). Necessarily, perhaps; entirely, no. As Hans Walter Gabler has argued, for example, an editor might choose to reproduce the first edition of *Werther* and ignore Goethe's later intentions, because the revision had little historical impact, whereas the first edition set off a wave of suicides in Europe.[7] But this is a reasoned choice; or if it is not, the possibility of a critical edition vanishes, and Tanselle, for one, does not admit this consequence. He thinks it "strange" that

[5] Fredson Bowers, *Textual & Literary Criticism* (Cambridge: UP, 1966), 18 and 81.

[6] D. F. McKenzie, "Printers of the Mind: Some Notes on Bibliographical Theories and Printing-House Practices," *Studies in Bibliography* 22 (1969): 1–75; Philip Gaskell, *From Writer to Reader: Studies in Editorial Method* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1978); Thorpe, *Principles*, ch. 5.

[7] "Textual Studies and Criticism," in *Editing in Australia*, ed. Paul Eggert (Campbell, ACT: English Dept., University College, ADFA, 1990), 9.

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"some people" cannot accept the primacy of physical evidence (139), for example; but this view merely locates "sociology" at an earlier critical stage than emendation. For Tanselle, apparently, it is not at all "strange" that Bowers can use a sociological criterion like intention to select the evidence, whereas "some people" are forbidden to contest the selection on different sociological criteria.

The issues are not merely theoretical: every question about the author's intention involves a question about the intentions of the editors, correctors, compositors and printers, who are also his or her earliest readers. To isolate the incontestable, "objective" physical facts from an allegedly arbitrary and "subjective" rationale leaves criticism helpless. Any emendation, for example, rejects the primacy of physical evidence: "but it *says* 'Bophocles,' Master," the Balliol student reading a borrowed essay protested, when challenged by Jebb; and Jebb, one trusts, enlightened his stupidity.[8] Reasonable men and women may well agree that one rationale is superior to another in its appropriateness to the readers' needs, its aesthetic result, or its historical realism.

In many, and I suspect in most, cases, moreover, multiple rationales may well arrive at nearly identical conclusions, even though the "truth" may well be more evident on one basis than on another. Most texts published before 1800, for example, survive in only a single substantive witness, and it is labor lost to spend much time on theory; in other, more complex cases, the editor may do much to secure agreement if he or she does not insist, as Bowers too frequently did, that his edition is the only possible, or "definitive" text. Textual introductions might well spend more time explaining the purpose of the edition, its intended audience (social factors, again!), and its limitations—it is essentially impossible, after all, to meet the needs of any and all audiences, even (or especially) in hypertext. And you cannot pour old wine into new bottles: Bowers wrote at a time when the author's intention and "what he actually wrote" were critically privileged, but times have changed, and editions must change with them. By education and temperament, too, Bowers was a man of broad literary and historical culture, and these theoretically extraneous considerations must, in a global way, have impinged on his conclusions, despite his self-denying editorial ordinance; nevertheless, his methods also had their price, which occasionally led him even to neglect "bibliographical evidence" in favor of the collational variants and *ad hoc* conjectures that were the meat and potatoes of his editing. This was certainly the case, at least, in his edition of *Tom Jones.*

Tanselle, I fear, misunderstands my contribution to this text, which Bowers accepted and eventually incorporated into the revised Wesleyan paperback edition.[9] I did *not* rest my case on "evidence, found in a Harvard copy," as Tanselle claims (94), perhaps mistaking the offset of a single cancellandum leaf

[8] I owe this excellent story to E. J. Kenney, *The Classical Text: Aspects of Editing in the Age of the Printed Book* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1974), 23.

[9] H. Amory, "*Tom Jones* Plus and Minus: Towards a Practical Text," *Harvard Library Bulletin* 25 (1977): 101–13.

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in a Harvard copy, reproduced in my article, for my entire proof. The bulk of the article concerned a different, whole-sheet cancellation in the first edition, and appealed to evidence present in all the copies I and Bowers had examined, and which Bowers unaccountably ignored in his bibliographical description: evidence of running titles (whose analysis, indeed, Bowers had once pioneered) and of watermarks. And Bowers did *not* reject "third edition revisions" in the Man-of-the-Hill section that were "not carried into the fourth," as Tanselle supposes, dazzled by the subtlety and complexity of Bowers's argument. On the contrary, he adopted many of these third-edition readings, rejecting only the apparent deletions. The entire third-edition text of this section, however (as I conjectured), probably descends from a cancellandum signature in the first edition and is therefore wholly unauthoritative. He was right to reject part of the third-edition readings, but not as right as most of his predecessors, who had rejected them all.

My conjecture indeed originated in a suspicion of Bowers's analysis—and why not? When Tanselle pleads that Bowers's argument "rested not only on bibliographical evidence but also on a large element of critical judgment," he rather overlooks the fact that the evidence was culpably incomplete, and the judgment crippled by *ad hoc* assumptions. The printing records of William Strahan showed that Strahan charged for one more sheet of the first edition than anyone could account for from the surviving copies; if Strahan was accurate, there must have been a whole-sheet cancel in the first edition, and the only question was where. If Bowers was right, moreover, the historical development of Fielding's attitude toward the Jacobites in *Tom Jones* contradicted the development in his other writings. The contradiction between history (in the broadest sense) and bibliographical analysis struck me as intolerable, and the sort of thing that a critical edition was bound to explain, though the Wesleyan editors did not even try to do so. The commentator's exclusive concern with historical and literary matters, and the textual editor's with bibliography and the text, prevented the issue from ever arising. My conjecture was materially aided by Bowers's demonstration that the extent of the third edition "revision" was limited to the text contained in a single sheet of the first, but his stinted editorial role and the inadequacy of his bibliographical description evidently blinded him to its implications. For Tanselle, "Bowers's textual essay on *Tom Jones* remains a fascinating demonstration of his mastery in handling complicated textual situations," an essay that Peter Miles also praised in a review for *The Library* (June 1979) as "very persuasive." In a sense, though, this very mastery was part of the problem. If Bowers had simply accepted the evidence of the Strahan Ledgers, instead of relying on his native wit, his analysis would have been less fascinating but more solid. Sadly, his fatal penchant for textual analysis triumphed over the bibliographical principles that he himself had vindicated in other instances.

Miles also pointed out a large number of inaccuracies in the apparatus, a not uncommon weakness of Bowers's editing, as Tanselle notes. Such lapses surprise us because he raised the art of editing to an entirely new level, and applied it to novels and philosophical works that had never before seen an apparatus. Tanselle's affection for his subject is such that he can regret the "incontestable, if unfortunate, contribution" of reviewers in disclosing the

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flaws of these editions (109). Surely that is what reviews are for? The reviewers of such admirable achievements as the Cook-Wedderburn Ruskin (1903–12) and R. W. Chapman's edition of Jane Austen (1924–32) perforce took their accuracy for granted, and no systematic advance on their work was possible, without entirely redoing it. A Bowers edition, on the contrary, set a benchmark both for the future and for the past, enabling not only reviewers but any scholar to reach a critical judgment on the text, wherever they found it. A line had been drawn before the herd of nineteenth- and twentieth- century reprints, and a new beginning, and yet the number of errors to be discovered in an edition, after all, is directly proportional to the information it sets forth.

Tanselle is right, then, to place Bowers's editing in the forefront of his achievement, rather than that much less controversial masterpiece, the *Principles of Bibliographical Description*, or his distinguished, long career as the editor of *Studies in Bibliography*. If a sense of disappointment lingers in some reviews of his work, much of it derives from a misplaced confidence in Bowers's own triumphant empowerment of bibliography as the royal road to textual truth. The bibliographical labor behind the Centenary *Scarlet Letter* garnered a disproportionately meager textual harvest, some believed; James Thorpe, an admirer, lamented "a certain repetitiveness of observation and example" in Bowers's theoretical writings—among them, the perennial "soiled fish" and "sallied flesh" (64). The "Bibliographical Way" petered out in the post-60s academic desert: we do not yet have and will probably never have an edition of Shakespeare based on Bowersian principles, and the support for many of the editions launched under Bowers's aegis is failing. A fit of personal pique may have prompted Edmund Wilson's famous attack, as Tanselle supposes, and yet he had a sharper sense for literary opportunities than Bowers; the Library of America, conducted along Wilsonian lines, has produced far more and more successful practical editions than the CEAA/CSE. Bowers inseparably yoked bibliography and editing, marginalizing the other uses of bibliography in "bibliophilia," "check-lists," and library cataloguing among the tertiary stages of the intellect; the linkage secured a place for his specialty in English departments (for a while), but in the theories of McGann, Bowers's birds have come home to roost, and literary theory has begun to sully (or should I say sally) the "physical facts." One might parody these recent developments as "literary theory for bibliographical students," were it not that today's Academe has no place for bibliography except as "information science," which is seemingly impervious to the magic of Derrida, Foucault, and Cixous.

The Life and Work of Fredson Bowers is openly apologetic—one might say needlessly so, if the mantle of his legacy did not so visibly rest on Tanselle's shoulders; but it provides a generally balanced and sober assessment of Bowers's achievement, detailing both his virtues and his failings. In the latter class, I would only question Tanselle's proposal to include a full list of all spelling and punctuation variants in the "Historical Collation," when all of these variants are judged unauthoritative within the Greg-Bowers "Rationale of Copy-Text." Such an apparatus, he urges, would allow the reader to judge the authority of the copy-text for himself. This proposal represents a major departure in the construction of an apparatus for an edition that rests on

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stemmatic criteria, as the "Rationale of Copy-Text" demands; one might with equal logic (and an even grosser subversion of the apparatus) include all known variants of the text down to the present day, in order to justify the authority of the lifetime editions. Tanselle has supported his plea at greater length in the 1994 issue of *Studies in Bibiliography*, as an extension of the principle that a critical edition rests on judgment, but judgment is as valid when it is exercised over whole classes of variants as it is in the individual case. There are many traditions to which "the method of Lachmann" is quite inapplicable, but Tanselle is the first, I believe, to reject its consequences for traditions in which the sources do in fact stand in a genealogical relationship.[10] In this respect, at least, I must avow myself a greater friend of the "Rationale of Copy-Text" than he is.

It would have been nice if the reviews of Bowers's work, detailed in Tanselle's "Note on Sources" (151–54) might have been distributed under the various editions listed in Battestin's bibliography; and some typos of the original issue of *Studies in Bibliography* have gone uncorrected; but *Studies in Bibliography* is one of the few books still printed by hot-metal, and doubtless these revisions would have been uneconomic. I only regret that Battestin, who has enlarged and corrected the checklist published in Bowers's collected *Essays* (1975), did not see fit to give the number of copies printed of the separata. Tanselle appropriately notes that 30,000 copies of the first edition (1963) of the MLA's *Aims and Methods of Scholarship* and 15,000 more of the 2nd edition (1970) were printed, for example. Professor Battestin (Bowers's literary executor) is presently seeking to assemble copies of Bowers's entire *œuvre*, to be housed in the English Department library; it should make a splendid show, though the expense is daunting (and I can testify that contributions are correspondingly welcome). He and Professor Tanselle should be congratulated on this useful and impressive tribute to a great teacher's memory.

Hugh Amory

Catalogue of the Papers of James Boswell at Yale University. Marion S. Pottle, Claude Colleer Abbott, and Frederick A. Pottle. 3 vols. The Yale Editions of the Private Papers of James Boswell: Research Edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, and New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1993. xxx + 386 pp.; x + 434 pp.; x +435 pp. $275.

WHAT IS A "PAPER OF JAMES BOSWELL"? This catalogue has seven sections, for papers bought by Yale in 1949:

J (Journals of James Boswell);

[10] Kenney, *The Classical Text*, 130, notes that "Its correctness in principle provided certain premisses are satisfied" is "a matter hardly open to question."

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